NIST · Shared reference library

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Common Control Library

Browse 1,193 controls and enhancements across 20 security and privacy families. Use the GovRAMP crosswalk to locate controls referenced by Security Snapshot, Core, and Moderate.

A shared catalog supports common-control planning; designation as a common, hybrid, or system-specific control depends on your organization’s implementation and inheritance decisions.

Sources and crosswalk scope

NIST OSCAL content 5.1.1+u4, retrieved 2026-09-18. GovRAMP Snapshot v1.4 and Core selection from Moderate v1.06 reference the December 2020 Rev. 5 text. Mappings establish exact identifier correspondence, not identical requirements, inherited implementation, or GovRAMP authorization. GovRAMP parameters and additional requirements remain authoritative for each program. Full Moderate, High, and other programs are not mapped here. Withdrawn controls are retained for reference.

Official pinned NIST source

SHA-256: 81cf2de45ede9aef3de7ce09d65ea9d32f662c483bbf916f6e346292b22f7763

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7 matching controls · Page 1 of 1

Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring · Base control

CA-7 · Continuous Monitoring

Control statement and discussion

NIST control statement

Develop a system-level continuous monitoring strategy and implement continuous monitoring in accordance with the organization-level continuous monitoring strategy that includes: a. Establishing the following system-level metrics to be monitored: [Assignment: system-level metrics]; b. Establishing [Assignment: frequencies] for monitoring and [Assignment: frequencies] for assessment of control effectiveness; c. Ongoing control assessments in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy; d. Ongoing monitoring of system and organization-defined metrics in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy; e. Correlation and analysis of information generated by control assessments and monitoring; f. Response actions to address results of the analysis of control assessment and monitoring information; and g. Reporting the security and privacy status of the system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Discussion

Continuous monitoring at the system level facilitates ongoing awareness of the system security and privacy posture to support organizational risk management decisions. The terms "continuous" and "ongoing" imply that organizations assess and monitor their controls and risks at a frequency sufficient to support risk-based decisions. Different types of controls may require different monitoring frequencies. The results of continuous monitoring generate risk response actions by organizations. When monitoring the effectiveness of multiple controls that have been grouped into capabilities, a root-cause analysis may be needed to determine the specific control that has failed. Continuous monitoring programs allow organizations to maintain the authorizations of systems and common controls in highly dynamic environments of operation with changing mission and business needs, threats, vulnerabilities, and technologies. Having access to security and privacy information on a continuing basis through reports and dashboards gives organizational officials the ability to make effective and timely risk management decisions, including ongoing authorization decisions. Automation supports more frequent updates to hardware, software, and firmware inventories, authorization packages, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security categories of systems. Monitoring requirements, including the need for specific monitoring, may be referenced in other controls and control enhancements, such as [AC-2g](#ac-2_smt.g), [AC-2(7)](#ac-2.7), [AC-2(12)(a)](#ac-2.12_smt.a), [AC-2(7)(b)](#ac-2.7_smt.b), [AC-2(7)(c)](#ac-2.7_smt.c), [AC-17(1)](#ac-17.1), [AT-4a](#at-4_smt.a), [AU-13](#au-13), [AU-13(1)](#au-13.1), [AU-13(2)](#au-13.2), [CM-3f](#cm-3_smt.f), [CM-6d](#cm-6_smt.d), [CM-11c](#cm-11_smt.c), [IR-5](#ir-5), [MA-2b](#ma-2_smt.b), [MA-3a](#ma-3_smt.a), [MA-4a](#ma-4_smt.a), [PE-3d](#pe-3_smt.d), [PE-6](#pe-6), [PE-14b](#pe-14_smt.b), [PE-16](#pe-16), [PE-20](#pe-20), [PM-6](#pm-6), [PM-23](#pm-23), [PM-31](#pm-31), [PS-7e](#ps-7_smt.e), [SA-9c](#sa-9_smt.c), [SR-4](#sr-4), [SC-5(3)(b)](#sc-5.3_smt.b), [SC-7a](#sc-7_smt.a), [SC-7(24)(b)](#sc-7.24_smt.b), [SC-18b](#sc-18_smt.b), [SC-43b](#sc-43_smt.b) , and [SI-4](#si-4).

GovRAMP crosswalk

GovRAMP Moderate Readiness · CA-7 — Direct NIST identifier reference. GovRAMP source matrix

System and Information Integrity · Base control

SI-12 · Information Management and Retention

Control statement and discussion

NIST control statement

Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and operational requirements.

Discussion

Information management and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond system disposal. Information to be retained may also include policies, procedures, plans, reports, data output from control implementation, and other types of administrative information. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides federal policy and guidance on records retention and schedules. If organizations have a records management office, consider coordinating with records management personnel. Records produced from the output of implemented controls that may require management and retention include, but are not limited to: All XX-1, [AC-6(9)](#ac-6.9), [AT-4](#at-4), [AU-12](#au-12), [CA-2](#ca-2), [CA-3](#ca-3), [CA-5](#ca-5), [CA-6](#ca-6), [CA-7](#ca-7), [CA-8](#ca-8), [CA-9](#ca-9), [CM-2](#cm-2), [CM-3](#cm-3), [CM-4](#cm-4), [CM-6](#cm-6), [CM-8](#cm-8), [CM-9](#cm-9), [CM-12](#cm-12), [CM-13](#cm-13), [CP-2](#cp-2), [IR-6](#ir-6), [IR-8](#ir-8), [MA-2](#ma-2), [MA-4](#ma-4), [PE-2](#pe-2), [PE-8](#pe-8), [PE-16](#pe-16), [PE-17](#pe-17), [PL-2](#pl-2), [PL-4](#pl-4), [PL-7](#pl-7), [PL-8](#pl-8), [PM-5](#pm-5), [PM-8](#pm-8), [PM-9](#pm-9), [PM-18](#pm-18), [PM-21](#pm-21), [PM-27](#pm-27), [PM-28](#pm-28), [PM-30](#pm-30), [PM-31](#pm-31), [PS-2](#ps-2), [PS-6](#ps-6), [PS-7](#ps-7), [PT-2](#pt-2), [PT-3](#pt-3), [PT-7](#pt-7), [RA-2](#ra-2), [RA-3](#ra-3), [RA-5](#ra-5), [RA-8](#ra-8), [SA-4](#sa-4), [SA-5](#sa-5), [SA-8](#sa-8), [SA-10](#sa-10), [SI-4](#si-4), [SR-2](#sr-2), [SR-4](#sr-4), [SR-8](#sr-8).

GovRAMP crosswalk

GovRAMP Moderate Readiness · SI-12 — Direct NIST identifier reference. GovRAMP source matrix

Supply Chain Risk Management · Base control

SR-4 · Provenance

Control statement and discussion

NIST control statement

Document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance of the following systems, system components, and associated data: [Assignment: systems, system components, and associated data].

Discussion

Every system and system component has a point of origin and may be changed throughout its existence. Provenance is the chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component, or associated data. Organizations consider developing procedures (see [SR-1](#sr-1) ) for allocating responsibilities for the creation, maintenance, and monitoring of provenance for systems and system components; transferring provenance documentation and responsibility between organizations; and preventing and monitoring for unauthorized changes to the provenance records. Organizations have methods to document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance baselines for systems, system components, and related data. These actions help track, assess, and document any changes to the provenance, including changes in supply chain elements or configuration, and help ensure non-repudiation of provenance information and the provenance change records. Provenance considerations are addressed throughout the system development life cycle and incorporated into contracts and other arrangements, as appropriate.

GovRAMP crosswalk

Not selected in the imported Snapshot or Core sets. This does not establish exclusion from other GovRAMP baselines.

Supply Chain Risk Management · Enhancement

SR-4(1) · Identity

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Control statement and discussion

NIST control statement

Establish and maintain unique identification of the following supply chain elements, processes, and personnel associated with the identified system and critical system components: [Assignment: supply chain elements, processes, and personnel].

Discussion

Knowing who and what is in the supply chains of organizations is critical to gaining visibility into supply chain activities. Visibility into supply chain activities is also important for monitoring and identifying high-risk events and activities. Without reasonable visibility into supply chains elements, processes, and personnel, it is very difficult for organizations to understand and manage risk and reduce their susceptibility to adverse events. Supply chain elements include organizations, entities, or tools used for the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations, maintenance, and disposal of systems and system components. Supply chain processes include development processes for hardware, software, and firmware; shipping and handling procedures; configuration management tools, techniques, and measures to maintain provenance; personnel and physical security programs; or other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production and distribution of supply chain elements. Supply chain personnel are individuals with specific roles and responsibilities related to the secure the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of a system or system component. Identification methods are sufficient to support an investigation in case of a supply chain change (e.g. if a supply company is purchased), compromise, or event.

GovRAMP crosswalk

Not selected in the imported Snapshot or Core sets. This does not establish exclusion from other GovRAMP baselines.

Supply Chain Risk Management · Enhancement

SR-4(2) · Track and Trace

View parent control

Control statement and discussion

NIST control statement

Establish and maintain unique identification of the following systems and critical system components for tracking through the supply chain: [Assignment: systems and critical system components].

Discussion

Tracking the unique identification of systems and system components during development and transport activities provides a foundational identity structure for the establishment and maintenance of provenance. For example, system components may be labeled using serial numbers or tagged using radio-frequency identification tags. Labels and tags can help provide better visibility into the provenance of a system or system component. A system or system component may have more than one unique identifier. Identification methods are sufficient to support a forensic investigation after a supply chain compromise or event.

GovRAMP crosswalk

Not selected in the imported Snapshot or Core sets. This does not establish exclusion from other GovRAMP baselines.

Supply Chain Risk Management · Enhancement

SR-4(3) · Validate as Genuine and Not Altered

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Control statement and discussion

NIST control statement

Employ the following controls to validate that the system or system component received is genuine and has not been altered: [Assignment: organization-defined controls].

Discussion

For many systems and system components, especially hardware, there are technical means to determine if the items are genuine or have been altered, including optical and nanotechnology tagging, physically unclonable functions, side-channel analysis, cryptographic hash verifications or digital signatures, and visible anti-tamper labels or stickers. Controls can also include monitoring for out of specification performance, which can be an indicator of tampering or counterfeits. Organizations may leverage supplier and contractor processes for validating that a system or component is genuine and has not been altered and for replacing a suspect system or component. Some indications of tampering may be visible and addressable before accepting delivery, such as inconsistent packaging, broken seals, and incorrect labels. When a system or system component is suspected of being altered or counterfeit, the supplier, contractor, or original equipment manufacturer may be able to replace the item or provide a forensic capability to determine the origin of the counterfeit or altered item. Organizations can provide training to personnel on how to identify suspicious system or component deliveries.

GovRAMP crosswalk

Not selected in the imported Snapshot or Core sets. This does not establish exclusion from other GovRAMP baselines.

Supply Chain Risk Management · Enhancement

SR-4(4) · Supply Chain Integrity — Pedigree

View parent control

Control statement and discussion

NIST control statement

Employ [Assignment: controls] and conduct [Assignment: analysis method] to ensure the integrity of the system and system components by validating the internal composition and provenance of critical or mission-essential technologies, products, and services.

Discussion

Authoritative information regarding the internal composition of system components and the provenance of technology, products, and services provides a strong basis for trust. The validation of the internal composition and provenance of technologies, products, and services is referred to as the pedigree. For microelectronics, this includes material composition of components. For software this includes the composition of open-source and proprietary code, including the version of the component at a given point in time. Pedigrees increase the assurance that the claims suppliers assert about the internal composition and provenance of the products, services, and technologies they provide are valid. The validation of the internal composition and provenance can be achieved by various evidentiary artifacts or records that manufacturers and suppliers produce during the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of technology, products, and services. Evidentiary artifacts include, but are not limited to, software identification (SWID) tags, software component inventory, the manufacturers’ declarations of platform attributes (e.g., serial numbers, hardware component inventory), and measurements (e.g., firmware hashes) that are tightly bound to the hardware itself.

GovRAMP crosswalk

Not selected in the imported Snapshot or Core sets. This does not establish exclusion from other GovRAMP baselines.